The day of the dismounted infantry attack into the teeth of the enemy is over. Anyone who insists on its use should be replaced. Frankly, the real answer to the marine requirement for operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) is a new family of 22-23 ton medium-weight armor equipped with the newest composite armor, hybrid-electric engines with an unrefueled range of 600 miles and automatic cannon or 120mm smooth bore cannon. If these vehicles swim, they do so with reasonable complexity at a reasonable speed of no more than 10 mph after being delivered at least 4,000 meters from shore by the U.S. Navy, which has to start doing its job. Now for the rest of the story:

1. Amphibious tractors designed to swim ashore and carry 20-25 men is TOO LARGE a target on land; it is too easy to hit and too thinly armored to survive.

2. To swim in the ocean, Amtracks have long noses to plow through the water that will impale themselves into uneven ground; result is they cannot go fast and tendency is to stick to roads/trails where enemy ambushes await.

Front Hull Overhang Ruins Cross-Country Mobility: here is an Army Stryker truck (LAV-III) like the USMC's LAV-1. General Dynamics Land Systems that usually builds something someone else designed (Canadian-made LAV-III/Stryker truck is a Mowag Piranha from Switzerland, M1 was from Chrysler) is designing the new bloated amtrack, the Expeditionary Forces Vehicle (EFV) which will also have a huge front hull overhang... stupidity repeats...

http://www.combatreform.com/strykerstuckhulloverhangtn.jpg

http://www.combatreform.com/strykerstuckhulloverhangyanked outbytracks.jpg

3. A large boat shape on tracks is too much to add extra armor outside to cover everywhere; underneath its difficult to attach plates without drilling holes that will let water; when you run over a land mine all of this metal compresses the explosion making it more deadly.

4. For land combat no more than one rifle squad and less than a dozen men should ever be in one armored vehicle; that vehicle should be armored with multiple layers to protect against RPGs and shrug off bomb blasts.

5. WHY pack vulnerable Amtracks with men and flammable ammo AND HIGH EXPLOSIVES when several where hit during invasion of Iraq at Nasiriyah resulting in dozens killed? Troops on top of SMALL tracked armored vehicles must not be surrounded by rockets, ammunition that if hull is penetrated will incinerate them; Extra ammo should be in trailers or strapped to outside near rear.

6. Why are inadequately protected Humvee 3-ton trucks leading 70-ton heavy tanks in the first place? Who made that decision?

7. Having only a few token LAV trucks with 25mm autocannon and tanks with 120mm guns is not enough firepower to smother a large area and asks crewmen inside to bear the brunt of all of the enemy's return fire, is it a wonder when they are knocked out?

8. Why are vehicles making U-turns in the face of enemy RPGs which exposes their weakest rear where engines and fuel tanks are? Why wasn't back up immediate action (IA) drills ready?

9. Why are we towing artillery that has to lob shells far away indiscriminately when Army armored self-propelled howitzers are available to drive up to specific buildings and just level them not neighborhoods?

10. Where are the tanks with mine rollers/plows to predet mines? If you don't have enough tanks you can't spare one to do mine roller/plow duty, and you end up losing tanks and killing men. Why are we not sealing the shoulders of roads with Rhino Snot and watching overhead with MANNED aircraft to prevent roadside bombs to be dug in? Where are the combat engineers?

http://www.combatreform.com/marinefootclusterfuckiniraq.jpg

Not the way to go

So not only is the USMC stupidly making the same bloated amtrack mistakes of the past, its compounding error by making the Army's Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle mistake by placing an overly large 2-man 30mm autocannon turret on the EFV, which will "smother" the infantry in back. Though a stablized, shoot-on-the-move autocannon is necessary and good, it should only be a small 1-man turret size so the infantry in back can see well enough so the dismounting platoon leader or platoon sergeant can command the vehicle from there or an adjacent hatch like the AAV7 or AIFV has. If dismount leaders are stuck in 2-man turrets they will not dismount to effectively lead troops for dismounted maneuvers. What's worse fears that the powerful 2-man turret could swing into the troops in back standing up in back could make risk-averse officials to order them to "button up" robbing us of 360 dgree all around security observation/fires to prevent fatal RPG and roadside bomb ambushes.

A Smaller Amphibious Tank is Needed and Has been Offered to USMC

http://www.combatreform.com GAVINmtvlamtracktn.jpg

http://www.combatreform.com/GAVINmtvlamtracks90mmassaultgu ntn.jpg

http://www.combatreform.com/GAVINmtvlamtracks50HMGturrettn .jpg

A good idea in 1945

http://www.combatreform.com/lvt4withgunshieldsinback.jpg

A GREAT IDEA FOR 2005...AND BEYOND!

http://www.combatreform.com/25mmamphigavintn.jpg